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What has driven trade booms and trade busts 
in the past century and a half? Was it changes 
in global output or in the costs of international 
trade? To address this question, we derive a 
micro-founded measure of aggregate bilateral 
trade costs based on a standard model of trade 
in differentiated goods. These trade costs gauge 
the difference between observed bilateral trade 
and frictionless trade in terms of an implied 
markup on retail prices of foreign goods. Thus, 
we are able to estimate the combined magnitude 
of tariffs, transportation costs, and all other 
macroeconomic frictions that impede interna-
tional trade but that are inherently difficult to 
observe. We use this measure to examine the 
growth of global trade between 1870 and 1913, 
its retreat from 1921 to 1939, and its subsequent 
rise from 1950 to 2000. We find that trade cost 
declines explain roughly 55 percent of the pre–
World War I trade boom and 33 percent of the 
post–World War II trade boom, while a precipi-
tous rise in trade costs explains the entire inter-
war trade bust.
I.  Trade Costs
International trade costs are the costs of 
transaction and transport associated with the 
exchange of goods across national borders and, 
thus, impede international economic integra-
tion. They may also drive many findings in the 
contemporary open-economy macroeconomics 
literature, such as home bias in trade and equity 
(Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff  2001). 
At the same time, economists know little about 
the magnitude, evolution, and determinants of 
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these obstacles to international trade (James E. 
Anderson and Eric van Wincoop 2004).
For example, research on the nineteenth-cen-
tury trade boom has tracked certain costs like 
freight rates and tariffs reasonably well (Michael 
A. Clemens and Jeffrey G. Williamson 2001; 
Jacks and Krishna Pendakur 2007; and Saif 
I. Shah Mohammed and Williamson, 2004). 
Likewise, Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. 
Irwin (1995) and Antoni Estevadeordal, Brian 
Frantz, and Alan M. Taylor (2003) have docu-
mented evidence on frictions during the interwar 
period, while Irwin (1995) and David Hummels 
(2007) have done much the same for the post–
World War II period. However, the magnitude and 
impact of a host of other important impediments 
to trade that are inherently difficult to measure, 
like informational, institutional, and nontariff 
barriers to trade, remain unexplored. There has 
also been very little work on consistently measur-
ing barriers to trade over the last 130 years.1 This 
paper is the first step in filling the gap on both 
counts of comprehensiveness and consistency.
Specifically, we present a micro-founded 
measure of aggregate trade costs. We focus on 
three periods: the first wave of globalization 
from 1870 to 1913, the interwar retreat dating 
from 1921, and the present-day rise of global-
ization dating from 1950. Consistent with the 
state-of-the-art gravity literature (e.g., Anderson 
and van Wincoop 2003), we derive this measure 
from a multiple-country general equilibrium 
model of trade in differentiated goods based on 
the approach by Novy (2007). The innovation 
of the micro-founded measure is to control for 
multilateral resistance in a tractable, yet previ-
ously unnoticed, way which makes it possible 
to back out the bilateral trade costs. The model 
yields a gravity equation of international trade 
1 A notable exception here is the work of Clemens 
and Williamson (2001) which documents worldwide tar-
iffs—measured as customs revenue over the declared value 
of imports—from 1875 to 1997. Shah Mohammed and 
Williamson (2004) also piece together information on ship-
ping costs from 1869 to 1950.
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that allows us to compute trade costs on the basis 
of bilateral trade, total trade, and output data.
Our baseline findings demonstrate that the 
average level of trade costs (expressed in tariff-
equivalent terms) between the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, and 18 of their 
trading partners2 fell by 23 percent relative to 
their domestic trade costs in the 40  years before 
World War I. For the same countries, we find 
that the average level of trade costs increased by 
10 percent in the 20 years from the end of World 
War I to the beginning of World War II. Finally, 
average trade costs are shown to have fallen by 
16 percent in the years after 1950.
After examining the levels and trends in trade 
costs, we turn to the determinants of trade costs. 
This exercise is meant to underscore that our 
trade cost measure is economically sensible. In 
particular, our evidence suggests that standard 
factors like geographic proximity, trade policy, 
adherence to fixed exchange rate regimes, and 
membership in the British Empire matter for 
explaining trade costs. A sizeable fraction of the 
variation remains unexplained, however, offer-
ing a promising avenue for future research.
Returning to the question of what drives glo-
balization episodes, we use the micro-founded 
gravity equation to attribute changes in global 
trade to two fundamental driving forces—
changes in productive capacity and changes in 
trade costs. For the pre–World War I period, we 
find that trade cost declines explain roughly 55 
percent of the growth in global trade. And con-
sistent with previous studies for the post–World 
War II period (see Scott L. Baier and Jeffrey H. 
Bergstrand 2001; John Whalley and Xian Xin 
2007), we find that only 33 percent of the pres-
ent-day global trade boom can be explained by 
the decline in trade costs. Thus, we document 
substantial differences between the two waves 
of globalization. Finally, the precipitous rise 
in trade costs following the Great Depression 
explains the entire interwar trade bust.
II.  Gravity Redux
Consider a world of N countries and a con-
tinuum of differentiated goods. Assume that 
countries specialize in a range of goods and that 
2 The countries in our sample include Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
consumers have constant elasticity of substitu-
tion preferences. In this context, Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) derive the following “grav-
ity” equation of international trade:
(1)  xij 5 
yi  yj
yW  a tijPi  Pj  b 12s,
where xij denotes exports from country i to j, yi 
and yj are the income levels of country i and j, y
W
 
is total world income, and s . 1 is the elastic-
ity of substitution. The trade cost factor, tij $ 1, 
is defined as the gross bilateral cost of import-
ing a good (one plus the tariff equivalent) so that 
if pi is the supply price of a good produced in 
country i, then pij 5 tij  pi is the price faced by 
consumers in country j. Trade costs are not con-
strained to be symmetric, but we will restrict our 
attention to the geometric average of trade costs 
going in either direction. Pi and Pj are country 
i’s outward and country j’s inward multilateral 
resistance variables, respectively. The multilat-
eral resistance variables capture countries’ aver-
age international trade barriers. The important 
insight of the model is that bilateral trade flows 
xij depend on the bilateral trade barrier tij rela-
tive to average international trade barriers.
A problem in the theoretical work so far has 
been to find an appropriate expression for the 
multilateral resistance variables. Novy (2007) 
demonstrates that an analytical solution for the 
price indices can readily be found. In particular, 
this solution is a function of intranational trade 
flows. Intuitively, the more a country trades 
with itself, the higher must be its average inter-
national trade barrier. This approach leads to a 
bilateral gravity equation of international trade 
of the following form:
(2)  xij xji 5 xii xjj a tij  tjitii  tjj b 12s.
The size variable in this gravity equation is 
not total income. Instead, the size variable is 
intranational trade, xii and xjj , which also con-
trols for multilateral resistance. The trade cost 
terms can be interpreted as the extent to which 
 international trade is more costly than domestic 
trade. We emphasize that we do not assume 
domestic trade costs to be zero, and that to be 
consistent with theory, bilateral trade costs must 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
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be measured against a benchmark (on this point, 
see Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). Using 
equation (2) we solve for the geometric average 
of the tariff equivalent, tij , of these costs as
(3)  tij 5 a xii  xjjxij  xji b 1/ 32 1s212 4 2 1.
We use this expression along with an extension 
of the trade and output data underlying Jacks, 
Meissner, and Novy (2006) to plot average bilat-
eral trade costs in Figures 1A through 1C.
III.  Trade Costs over Time
Figures 1A through 1C are normalized to 100 
for the initial observation in each period, i.e., 
1870, 1921, and 1950, so that they are not com-
parable in terms of levels over time. Our goal, 
instead, is to highlight the changes within a 
given period. Thus, for the first wave of global-
ization from 1870 to 1913, we document an aver-
age decline in international, relative to domestic, 
trade costs of 23 percent, led by a nearly 30 per-
cent decline for the United States, while France 
and the United Kingdom muster a roughly 20 
percent decline. We can note that most of the 
decline, especially for France and the United 
Kingdom, is concentrated in the 1870s. This was, 
of course, a time of simultaneously declining 
freight rates and tariffs, as well as increasing 
adherence to the gold standard. In subsequent 
periods, the decline in freight rates was substan-
tially moderated, while tariffs climbed in most 
countries, dating from the beginning of German 
protectionist policy in 1879.
Turning to the interwar period from 1921 to 
1939, we can see that the various attempts to 
restore the prewar international order—e.g., res-
toration of the gold standard and the normaliza-
tion of trading relationships—were somewhat 
successful. Trade costs fell on average by 4 per-
cent up to 1929. Although much less dramatic 
than the fall for the entire period from 1870 
to 1913, this average decline matches that for 
the equivalent period from 1905 to 1913. The 
turning point of the Great Depression, how-
ever, marks the most dramatic increase in trade 
costs in our sample, as they jump on average by 
18 percentage points in the space of the three 
years between 1929 and 1932. This, of course, 
corresponds exactly to the well-documented 
implosion of international trade in the face of 
declining output and highly protectionist trade 
policy. Trade costs declined from these heights, 
but not enough to reach their 1921 levels: aver-
age trade costs stood 10 percent higher at the 
outbreak of World War II.
Finally, the second era of globalization from 




















Figure 1A. Trade Cost Indices, 1870–1913 (1870 5 100)
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costs on the order of 16 percent. The most dra-
matic decline was that for France, at 25 percent, 
while the most recalcitrant decline was that for 
the United Kingdom, at 19 percent. Thus, there 
seems to be a slightly greater heterogeneity of 
experience than in the past. 
IV.  The Determinants of Trade Costs
Trade costs in our model are derived from 
a gravity equation rather than estimated as is 
typically the case in the literature. Commonly, 
log-linear versions of equation (1) are estimated 
by substituting an arbitrary trade cost function 
for tij . Such specifications, to the extent that the 
trade cost function and the econometric model 
are well specified, could be used to provide esti-
mated values of trade costs. We proceed in the 
opposite direction and derive the implied trade 
costs directly from the model without imposing 
a trade cost function.
We show below that our trade cost measure 
is related in sensible ways to standard proxies 
for international trade costs. The determinants 
we consider in our log-linear model of trade 
costs include the logarithm of distance between 
two countries, the log product of each country 
pair’s ratio of customs revenues to total imports, 
 bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility, an 
indicator variable for whether the two countries 
had a fixed exchange rate with one another, and 
an indicator for whether the two countries were 
both in the British Empire. We include country 
pair random effects, as well as year indicators. 
The reported regression pools the data for the 51 
dyads between 1870 and 1913, 1921 and 1939, 
and 1950 and 2000, generating the following 
results (t-statistics in parentheses):
 tij 5 0.08 3 ln 1distance 2 4
 (8.07)
 1 0.03 3 ln 1tariffsi *tariffsj 2 4
 (13.06)
 1 0.44 3s(e)4 2 0.01 3Fixed 4	 (7.70) (1.93)	 2 0.42 [British Empire]
 (8.41)
 N 5 5758, R2 5 0.42
We find that a one-standard-deviation rise in 
distance raises trade costs by 0.40 standard 
deviations, while an equivalent increase in our 
tariff measure would be associated with a trade 
cost rise of 0.42 standard deviations. Exchange 
rate volatility raises trade costs, while fixed 
exchange rate regimes decrease trade costs—but 
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both only marginally. Finally, membership in 
the British Empire appears to have substantially 
decreased trade costs, although we note that in 
unreported regressions by period, this effect has 
strongly diminished through time.
These results demonstrate that standard fac-
tors that are known to be frictions in international 
trade are sensibly related to the trade cost mea-
sure. By extension, the results from the regression 
equation show that the trade cost measure deter-
mines trade patterns in ways largely consistent 
with the gravity literature (cf. J. Ernesto López-
Córdova and Christopher M. Meissner 2003 for 
the pre–World War I period; Eichengreen and 
Irwin 1995 for the interwar period; and Andrew 
K. Rose 2000 for the post–World War II period).
V.  Economic Expansion versus Trade Costs
We now turn to a decomposition of the growth 
of trade flows in the three periods. Gravity equa-
tion (2) can be used to attribute changes in trade 
flows to changes in domestic economic activity 
(owing to income expansion and changes in mul-
tilateral trade barriers) and changes in bilateral 
trade costs. We first log-linearize (2), then, at the 
bilateral level, we take the difference between 
levels in initial years (1870, 1921 and 1950) 
and end-point years (1913, 1939 and 2000), and 
finally we average across dyads. We report the 
results from this exercise in Table 1.
Although the percentage growth in trade vol-
umes is roughly comparable in the two waves of 
globalization (at 400 and 471 percent, respec-
tively), the principal driving forces are reversed. 
In the period from 1870 to 1913, trade cost 
declines account for a majority (55 percent) of 
the growth in international trade, while in the 
period from 1950 to 2000 trade cost declines 
account for a distinct minority (33 percent) of 
trade growth. This is congruent with traditional 
narratives of the late-nineteenth century as a 
period of radical declines in domestic and inter-
national transportation costs, payments frictions, 
and protective trade policy, as well as studies on 
the growth of world trade in the contemporary 
world which suggest that such changes may have 
been more muted. This differential response 
also raises questions, however, regarding the 
relatively low manufactured content of trade in 
the earlier period and the increased prominence 
of variety growth and inter-industry trade in the 
later period. Again, sorting out these factors 
remains an important topic for future research.
Finally, in explaining the trade bust of the 
1930s, the role of trade costs is dominant. Based 
on output growth alone, we would have expected 
world trade volumes to increase by nearly 90 per-
cent. The fact that they declined by 13 percent 
clearly underlines the critical role of commercial 
policy—and potentially the collapse of the gold 






















Figure 1C. Trade Cost Indices, 1950–2000 (1950 5 100).
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Table 1—Decomposition of Trade Booms and Busts, 1870–2000 
(a.k.a. The History of World Trade in 9 Numbers)
Average growth in Contribution of Contribution of
international trade growth in output change in trade costs
1870–1913 Full sample, N 5 51 400.4% 5 17.64% 1 224.0%
France, N 5 18 351.3% 5 147.1% 1 204.2%
UK, N 5 18 289.7% 5 156.1% 1 133.6%
US, N 5 18 529.1% 5 230.3% 1 298.8%
1921–1939 Full sample, N 5 51 213.1% 5 89.3% 1 2102.4%
France, N 5 18 250.9% 5 97.3% 1 2148.2%
UK, N 5 18 22.1% 5 87.7% 1 289.8%
US, N 5 18 21.1% 5 84.3% 1 285.4%
1950–2000 Full sample, N 5 51 471.3% 5 314.6% 1 156.7%
France, N 5 18 578.0% 5 327.6% 1 204.2%
UK, N 5 18 373.8% 5 279.7% 1 94.1%
US, N 5 18 480.1% 5 332.6% 1 147.5%
